

# Icebergs in the Clouds: the *Other* Risks of Cloud Computing

Bryan Ford

Yale University

<http://bford.info/>

## Abstract

Cloud computing is appealing from management and efficiency perspectives, but brings risks both known and unknown. Well-known and hotly-debated information security risks, due to software vulnerabilities, insider attacks, and side-channels for example, may be only the “tip of the iceberg.” As diverse, independently developed cloud services share ever more fluidly and aggressively multiplexed hardware resource pools, unpredictable interactions between load-balancing and other reactive mechanisms could lead to dynamic instabilities or “meltdowns.” Non-transparent layering structures, where alternative cloud services may appear independent but share deep, hidden resource dependencies, may create unexpected and potentially catastrophic failure correlations, reminiscent of financial industry crashes. Finally, cloud computing exacerbates already-difficult digital preservation challenges, because only the provider of a cloud-based application or service can archive a “live,” functional copy of a cloud artifact and its data for long-term cultural preservation. This paper explores these largely unrecognized risks, making the case that we should study them *before* our socioeconomic fabric becomes inextricably dependent on a convenient but potentially unstable computing model.

## 1 Introduction

Attractive features and industry momentum make cloud computing appear destined to be the next dominant computing paradigm. Cloud computing is appealing due to the convenience of central management and the elasticity of resource provisioning. Moving critical information infrastructure to the cloud also presents risks, however, some of which are well-known and already hot research topics. The much-discussed challenge of ensuring the privacy of information hosted in the cloud, for example [5], has resulted in an emerging breed of “cloud-hardened” virtualization hardware [8] and security kernels [23]. Similarly, the challenge of ensuring high availability in the cloud has in part fueled recent research on robust data center networking [14, 20].

This paper assumes that a large fraction of the computing industry is, for better or worse, “moving to the cloud,” and that current research addressing the immediate information security risks is well underway and will

(eventually) succeed. Setting aside these known challenges, therefore, this paper attempts to identify and focus on several *less* well-understood—and perhaps less “imminent”—risks that *may* emerge from the shift to cloud computing. In particular, this paper addresses: (1) **stability** risks due to unpredictable interactions between independently developed but interacting cloud computations; (2) **availability** risks due to non-transparent layering resulting in hidden failure correlations; and (3) **preservation** risks due to the unavailability of a cloud service’s essential code and data outside of the provider.

This paper is speculative and forward-looking; the author cannot yet offer definitive evidence that any of these risks *will* fully materialize or become vitally important, but rather can offer only informal arguments and anecdotal evidence that these risks *might* become important issues. The above list is also probably incomplete: it is likely that other important risks will emerge only as the industry continues its shift to the cloud. Nevertheless, I argue that it is worth proactively investigating longer-term risks such as these before they are certain or imminent, as the stakes may be high. Further, once any of these risks *do* become important, it may be too late to reconsider or slow the movement of critical infrastructure to the cloud, or to rethink the architecture of important cloud infrastructure or services once they are already perceived as “mature” in the industry.

Section 2 addresses stability risks, Section 3 explores availability risks, and Section 4 explores preservation risks. Section 5 briefly points out a few possible research directions in which solutions might be found—though this paper cannot and does not pretend to offer “answers.” Finally, Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Stability Risks from Interacting Services

Cloud services and applications increasingly build atop one another in ever more complex ways, such as cloud-based advertising or mapping services used as components in other, higher-level cloud-based applications, all of these building on computation and storage infrastructure offered by still other providers. Each of these interacting, codependent services and infrastructure components is often implemented, deployed, and maintained independently by a single company that, for reasons of competition, shares as few details as possible about the internal operation of its services. The resource provi-




Figure 1: Example instability risk from unintended coupling of independently developed reactive controllers

sioning and moment-by-moment operation of each service is often managed by dynamic, reactive control processes that constantly monitor the behavior of customer load, internal infrastructure, and other component services, and implement complex proprietary policies to optimize the provider’s cost-benefit ratio.

Each cloud service’s control loop may change the service’s externally visible behavior, in policy-specific ways, based on its neighboring services’ behavior, creating cyclic control dependencies between interacting cloud services. These dependency cycles may lead to unexpected feedback and instability, in much the way that policy-based routing in BGP is already known to lead to instability or “route flapping” in the much more restricted “control domain” of Internet routing [6, 18].

To illustrate this risk, we consider a minimalistic, perhaps contrived, but hopefully suggestive example in Figure 1. Application provider *A* develops and deploys a cloud-based application, which runs on virtual compute and storage nodes from infrastructure provider *B*. For simplicity, assume *A* leases two virtual nodes from *B*, and dynamically load-balances incoming requests across the web/application servers running on these nodes. Assume *A*’s load balancer operates in a control loop with a 1-minute period: after each minute it evaluates each server’s current load based on that server’s response time statistics during the past minute, and shifts more traffic during the next minute to the less-loaded server. Assume that *A*’s load shifting algorithm is well-designed and stable assuming the servers in the pool behave consistently over time, like dedicated physical servers would.

Unbeknownst to *A*, however, suppose *B* also runs a control loop, which attempts to optimize the power consumption of its physical servers by dynamically adjusting the servers’ clock rates based on load. This control loop also happens to have a 1-minute period: after each minute, *B*’s controller measures each CPU core’s utilization during the past minute, then reduces the core’s voltage and speed if the core was underutilized or increases voltage and speed if the core was overutilized.

Again, assume that *B*’s controller is well-designed and stable assuming that the servers’ load stays relatively constant or varies independently of *B*’s control actions.

Although both *A*’s and *B*’s control loops would be stable if operating alone, by the misfortune of their engineers (independently) picking similar control loop periods, the combination of the two control loops may risk a positive feedback loop. Suppose during one minute the load is slightly imbalanced toward virtual server 1, and the two control loops’ periods happen to be closely aligned; this will happen sooner or later in the likely event their clocks run at slightly different rates. *A*’s load balancer notices this and shifts some load away from the node in the next minute, while *B*’s power optimizer notices the same thing and increases the node’s voltage and clock speed. While either of these actions alone would lead toward convergence, the two in combination cause overcompensation: during the next minute, server 1 becomes *more* underutilized than it was overutilized in the previous minute. The two controllers each compensate with a stronger action—a larger shift of traffic back to server 1 by *A* and a larger decrease in voltage and clock speed by *B*—causing a larger swing the next minute. Soon all incoming load is oscillating between the two servers, cutting the system’s overall capacity in half—or worse, if more than two servers are involved.

This simplistic example might be unlikely to occur in exactly this form on real systems—or might be quickly detected and “fixed” during development and testing—but it suggests a general risk. When multiple cloud services independently attempt to optimize their own operation using control loops that both monitor, and affect, the behavior of upstream, downstream, or neighboring cloud services, it is hard to predict the outcome: we might well risk deploying a combination of control loops that behaves well “almost all of the time,” until the emergence of the rare, but fatal, cloud computing equivalent of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge [3, 10].

Comparable forms of “emergent misbehavior” have been observed in real computing systems outside of the cloud context [11], and some work has studied the challenge of coordinating and stabilizing multiple interacting control loops, such as in power management [13]. Current approaches to solving or heading off such instability risks, however, generally assume that *some* single engineer or company has complete information about, and control over, all the interacting layers and their control loops. The cloud business model undermines this design assumption, by incentivizing providers *not* to share with each other the details of their resource allocation and optimization algorithms—crucial parts of their “secret sauce”—that would be necessary to analyze or ensure the stability of the larger, composite system.




Figure 2: Cloud service stack illustrating risks of correlated failures due to hidden service interdependencies

### 3 Risks of Hidden Failure Correlations

Ensuring high availability is usually a high priority for cloud infrastructure and services, and state replication and fault tolerance mechanisms is the focus of much industry and research attention. Most of this attention is focused *within* a particular cloud service, however. In addition to the stability risks discussed above, interactions between multiple interdependent cloud services could lead to availability risks not yet addressed in mainstream research, where hardware infrastructure interdependencies hidden by proprietary business relationships can lead to unexpected failure correlations.

As another contrived but illustrative example, consider the “cloud service stack” in Figure 2. The provider at the top offers a cloud-based application intended to offer mission-critical reliability. To ensure this reliability, the application replicates all critical application state across the storage services provided by two nominally-independent cloud storage providers, A and B, each of which in turn provides storage at multiple geographic sites with separate network connectivity at each site.

Unbeknownst to the application provider, however, each storage provider obtains its network connections from a common underlying network provider, C. The application’s access to its critical storage proves highly reliable as long as provider C operates normally. If provider C encounters a rare disaster or administrative glitch, however—or enters a dispute with another top-tier network provider [4]—the mission-critical application may suddenly lose connectivity to *both* of its critical storage repositories. This correlated failure results from the shared dependencies on C being hidden by the proprietary business relationships through which the application provider obtains services from A and B.

As the cloud computing industry matures and produces ever more complex cloud-based services, it seems inevitable that the depth and complexity of inter-service relationships will continue to explode, which may create unpredictable availability risks due to ever more subtle cross-layer interdependencies, of which the above example is merely the most simplistic representative. Furthermore, one of the fundamental attractions of cloud computing is that it makes computing infrastructure, services, and applications into generic, almost arbitrarily

“fungible” resources that can be bought, sold, and resold as demanded by business objectives [21].

It does not seem far-fetched to predict that cloud services will arise that represent a thin veneer over, or “repackaging” of, other services or combinations of services: e.g., businesses that resell, trade, or speculate on complex cocktails or “derivatives” of more basic cloud resources and services, much like the modern financial and energy trading industries operate. If this prediction bears out, the cloud services industry could similarly start yielding speculative bubbles and occasional large-scale failures, due to “overly leveraged” composite cloud services whose complex interdependencies hide correlated failure modes that do not become apparent until the bubble bursts catastrophically—perhaps not wholly unlike the causes of the recent financial meltdown or the earlier Enron energy bubble [7]. Once again, while this risk is pure speculation at this point, it seems worth taking seriously and exploring in advance.

### 4 Digital Preservation Risks

The final risk considered here is more long-term. With the tremendous economic momentum toward cloud-based and cloud-dependent applications and services, it appears inevitable that these cloud-based “digital artifacts” will soon represent a considerable and ever-increasing component of our social and cultural heritage. In 100 years, however, will today’s culturally important cloud-based digital artifacts still be available in a historically accurate form—or in any form?

A physical book has an inherent *decentralized archivability* property. In order to make money on a book, its author or publisher must make complete copies available to customers. Customers in turn are free to—and cannot effectively be prevented from—independently storing books for any amount of time, relocating copies to a safe long-term repository (e.g., a library), copying them to other media as the original media deteriorates, etc.

Preservation of digital works presents many known challenges—principally the faster deterioration or obsolescence of electronic media, and the obsolescence of computing environments needed to interpret old data formats [1, 9, 15]. Yet despite these known challenges, traditional software and associated documents stored on a floppy or hard disk, USB stick, or even a “cloud drive” holding raw files, still has the same *decentralized archivability* property of a book. The vendor of a traditional software application or digital document must, in order to make money, make essentially *complete* copies available to customers, and these customers can work in an arbitrarily decentralized fashion using their own resources to preserve digital works deemed worth saving.

Cloud-based applications and services, however, completely eliminate this property of decentralized

archivability. Unlike users of Microsoft Office, users of Google Search or Maps never gain access to anything remotely resembling a “complete copy” of the entire digital artifact represented by the Google Search or Maps service. At most, users might save the results of particular queries or interactions. Unlike players of Doom, players of World of Warcraft (WoW) cannot independently archive and preserve a copy of the WoW universe—or even a small portion of interest—because the provider of the cloud-based application need not, and typically does not, make publicly available the server-side software and data comprising the service.

Given the number of scholarly papers written on the technological and social implications of each, it would be hard to argue that Google Search and WoW do not represent a historically significant digital artifacts. Yet given the rate that Google and Blizzard evolve their services to compete more effectively in the search and gaming markets, respectively, it is almost certain that ten years from now, no one outside these companies—perhaps not even anyone *inside* them—will be able to reproduce a faithful, functioning copy of the Google Search or WoW service *as it exists today*. In 100 years, these services will probably have evolved beyond recognition, assuming they survive at all.

If today’s digital archivists do their jobs well, in 100 years we will be able to run today’s Microsoft Word or play Doom (in an emulator if necessary)—but nothing today’s digital archivists can do will preserve historically relevant snapshots of today’s cloud-based services, because the archivists never even get access to a “complete” snapshot for preservation.

The historical record of today’s Google Search or WoW will consist merely of second-hand accounts: articles written about them, saved search queries or screen shots, captured videos of particular WoW games, etc. While better than nothing, such second-hand accounts would not suffice for future historians to answer questions such as: “How did the focus or breadth of search results for interesting queries evolve over the last 10 or 100 years?” Or, “How did social-interaction and player-reward mechanisms change in MMOGs historically?”

These particular examples may or may not seem interesting or important, but the point is that *we don’t know* what future historians or social scientists will deem important about today’s world. As more of today’s culture shifts to the cloud, our failure to preserve our cloud-based digital artifacts could produce a “digital dark age” far more opaque and impenetrable to future generations than what media or OS obsolescence alone will produce.

## 5 In Search of Possible Solutions

This paper cannot hope to—and makes no attempt to—offer solutions or answers to the problems outlined

above. Instead, we merely conjecture at a few potential directions in which solutions *might* be found.

**Stabilizing Cloud Services:** One place we might begin to study stability issues between interacting cloud services, and potential solutions, is the extensive body of work on the unexpected inter-AS (Autonomous System) interactions frequently observed in BGP routing [6, 18]. In particular, the “dependency wheel” model, useful for reasoning about BGP policy loops, seems likely to generalize to higher-level control loops in the cloud, such as load balancing policies. Most of the potential *solutions* explored so far in the BGP space, however, appear largely specific to BGP—or at least to routing—and may have to be rethought “from scratch” in the context of more general, higher-level cloud services.

Beyond BGP, classic control theory may offer a broader source of inspiration for methods of understanding and ensuring cloud stability. Most conventional control-theoretic techniques, however, are unfortunately constructed from the assumption that some “master system architect” can control or at least describe all the potentially-interacting control loops in a system to be engineered. The cloud computing model violates this assumption at the outset by juxtaposing many interdependent, reactive control mechanisms that are by nature *independently* developed, and are often the proprietary and closely-guarded business secrets of each provider.

**Deep Resource (In)Dependence Analysis:** The availability risks discussed in Section 3 result from the fact that cloud service and infrastructure providers usually do not reveal the deep dependency structure underlying their services. The key to this risk is the non-transparency of the dependency graph: the application provider in Figure 2 *does not know* that both A and B depend on the same network provider C, resulting in hidden failure correlations. Supposing the providers were to make these dependencies visible in an explicit dependency graph, however, we might be able to estimate *actual* dependence or independence between different services or resources for reliability analysis.

Hardware design techniques such as fault tree analysis [2, 19] may offer some tools that could be adapted to the purpose of reasoning about cloud service and infrastructure dependencies. Consider for example a simplistic AND/OR resource dependency graph, shown in Figure 3. AND nodes reflect design composition and hence conjunctive dependency: *all* components underneath an AND node must function correctly in order for the component above to operate. OR nodes reflect design redundancy and hence disjunctive dependency: if *any* component underneath the OR node operates, the dependent component above the OR will operate. Given such a graph, annotated with expected failure rates, one




Figure 3: AND/OR Graph Representing Service Composition and Infrastructure Dependencies

might compute or estimate a system’s *effective* reliability after accounting for unanticipated common dependencies, such as Network Provider C in the example.

Cloud providers may be reluctant to release detailed dependency information publicly for business reasons, but might willing release it to a trusted third party, such as an organization analogous to Underwriters Laboratories (UL) offering cloud reliability analysis services. More ambitiously, cloud providers might leverage TPM-attested, IFC-enforcing kernels [22] to exchange and analyze dependency graph information, without allowing proprietary information to “leak” beyond this analysis.

**Preserving Cloud Artifacts:** Enabling the long-term preservation of cloud artifacts will require solving both incentive problems and technical challenges.

In a cloud-based computing model, application and service providers currently need not, and have little incentive to, make publicly available all the software and data underlying the service that would be necessary for accurate historical preservation. Competition encourages providers to closely guard the “secret sauce” underlying their products. This incentive has long led traditional software vendors to release their software only in binary form—often with deliberate obfuscation to thwart analysis—but only the cloud model frees the vendor entirely from the need to release their code in *any* form directly executable by the customer. Solving this incentive problem will likely require social, commercial, and/or governmental incentives for providers to make their cloud-based artifacts preservable in some way.

On the technical side, cloud-based services often rely on enormous, frequently-changing datasets, such as the massive distributed databases underlying Google Search or Maps or an MMOG’s virtual world. Even if willing, it might be impractically costly for providers to ship regular snapshots of their entire datasets to digi-

tal archivists—even well-provisioned ones such as the Library of Congress—not to mention costly for receiving archivists to do anything with such enormous snapshots beyond saving the raw bits. A more practical approach may be for providers themselves to be responsible for saving historical snapshots in the short term, using standard copy-on-write cloning and deduplicated storage technologies for efficiency [12, 16]. After some time period, say 5–10 years, a select subset of these historical snapshots might then be transferred to external archives for long-term preservation, at considerably reduced cost-per-bit in terms of both network bandwidth and storage due to intervening technological evolution.

Any solution would need to address many other challenges, such as ensuring the durability and integrity of online digital archives [9] and the honesty of their providers [17], maintaining information security of sensitive data in snapshots of cloud-based artifacts, and preserving artifacts’ practical usability in addition to their raw bits, but we leave these issues to future work.

## 6 Conclusion

While the cloud computing model is promising and attractive in many ways, the author hopes that this paper has made the case that the model may bring risks beyond obvious information security concerns. At the very least, it would be prudent for us to study some of these risks *before* our socioeconomic system becomes completely and irreversibly dependent on a computing model whose foundations may still be incompletely understood.

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